On Paradox of the Stone
”God cannot create a stone he cannot lift. So, God is not omnipotent.”
The quote given above is the conclusion Wade Savage derived from the stone’s paradox and discussed. In this essay, firstly, I will discuss George Mavrodes’ notions on the stone’s paradox. Then, Wade Savage’s thoughts on the stone’s paradox will be discussed, including Savage’s responses to Mavrodes. For further novel analysis and discussion, I will discuss Fichte’s approach to the stone’s paradox.
The paradox of the stone is one of the attempts to understand omnipotence and problems with it. Precisely, the paradox questions the implications of God being able to (or not being able to) create a stone he cannot lift. With this paradox, it is aimed to question if omnipotence is possible and what are the potential problems with omnipotence. Defining omnipotence is a problem that is faced while evaluating this paradox. Various sources state omnipotence is great, maximal power (Omnipotence (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), 2017). There is an agreement on this definition of defining omnipotence. However, there is a great division between philosophers concerning the implications of omnipotence.
In Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas provides his account of the stone’s paradox: self-contradictory actions cannot be accounted for when questioning one’s abilities (Kreeft, 1993). Mavrodes gives further analysis of the paradox while considering Aquinas’ notions of the paradox. In the argument for the paradox of the stone, God is supposedly engaging in a self-contradictory action. Mavrodes explains this contradiction with the example; “If I am not able to draw a square circle, that does not indicate I am incapable of doing something.” and the reason is that it is evident that drawing a square circle is not possible (Mavrodes, 1963). If we are to proceed with assuming God is omnipotent, then the premise “God cannot create a stone he cannot lift.” does not damage God’s supposed omnipotence; since the action is self-contradictory.
Contrary to Mavrodes, Savage proposes that omnipotence is not possible so that no assumption can be made. Savage suggests that the argument provided for the paradox of the stone is not paradoxical because we can attain a valid conclusion from the argument. He agrees upon the idea that “God cannot create a stone he cannot lift.” is a self-contradictory statement. However, Savage claims that the “contradiction” does not make the argument invalid. If God can create a stone he cannot lift, then there is something he cannot do; he is not omnipotent; if God cannot create a stone he cannot lift, then there is something he can do, then he is not omnipotent. So, we can clarify that the premises’ pattern and the conclusion are considered, the argument seems to show validity. Therefore, it is not needed to look at contradictions because the argument has shown to be logically possible (Savage, 1967).
Before getting to Fichte’s work on stone’s paradox, it is relevant to consider the era’s theological environment right before Fichte, concerning both Church and philosophical ground. At the time, God of the Church and God in philosophical context collided, and there was a commotion concerning the distinction of meanings. Until then, God was understood in two definitions: Either God was of the same age as the Universe, or God was present before the Universe. The first indicates that God is Universe, in line with Schelling’s notion of God being universalized (Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), 2020). The latter was more related to the Church’s perspective; God existed before the Universe, so he created the Universe. Fichte strived to give a detailed account of God using logical explanations.
When Fichte asked his students,” Can God create a stone he cannot lift?” his primary purpose was to ask,” Can God have a property?”. If God has a property, namely, the ability to create a stone he cannot lift, he is not omnipotent. The reason is that having a property means filling some space, which limits God’s omnipotence (Porphyrios, 1948, pp. 50–53). This explanation is logically equivalent to God being infinite if he does not have any properties; because then, God could not have limits for having space in the Universe (Hegel, 1801). It could be inferred that Fichte’s explanation for God’s omnipotence was an explicit criticism of religious perspective towards God because Fichte observed that religious context involved people making assumptions and generating arguments on God’s largeness. But if we consider the final premise,” If God is infinite, he does not fill space,” the immensity is insignificant for infinity.
Considering Mavrodes, his account of God’s omnipotence is at a certain level, together with Fichte’s notion of omnipotence. Mavrodes gives little explanation concerning self-contradictory about creating a stone that cannot be lifted and God’s omnipotence. However, the contradiction indicates that it is contradictory to assume that God has abilities that can be defined by the space he covers in the Universe. So, Mavrodes lacks a foundational definition of what omnipotence is in his account of the paradox; he avoids the question by precluding self-contradictory actions. Relating Savage’s thoughts to Fichte’s, Savage takes an approach that saliently divides the notion of omnipotence from the God that is” creator of the Universe.” So, one can say that Savage’s argument is in line with saying that” God cannot be the creator of the Universe because creating would give him a property; which limits God. Hence, indicating he is not omnipotent.
Mavrodes, Savage, Fichte, and many other philosophers (e.g., Aquinas, Schelling) have given some thoughts and works about stone’s paradox. Their omnipotence accounts show that one should form a ground for what omnipotence is to question omnipotence. Also, one’s definition of omnipotence has a significant implication on the formation of arguments regarding omnipotence.
References
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). (2020, May 18). Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schelling/
Hegel, G. W. F. (1801). Lectures on the philosophy of religion, together with a work on the proofs of the existence of God … tr. from the 2d German ed. by … E. B. Speirs … and J. B. Sanderson, the translation ed. by … E. B. Speirs .. : Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770–1831 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive. https://archive.org/details/lecturesonphilos01hege
Kreeft, P. (1993). A Shorter Summa: The Essential Philosophical Passages of Saint Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica (First ed.). Ignatius Press.
Mavrodes, G. I. (1963). Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence. The Philosophical Review, 72(2), 221. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183106
Omnipotence (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). (2017, June 22). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/omnipotence/
Porphyrios. (1948). İsagoji. Atademir Yayınevi.
Savage, C. W. (1967). The Paradox of the Stone. The Philosophical Review, 76(1), 74. https://doi.org/10.2307/2182966
